AWWA ACE60081

The water industry has been conducting vulnerability assessments of criticalwater infrastructure. These assessments produce outputs that will promptsome tough expenditure decisions. In an industry already faced with thecombined costs of increasingly stringent regulations, infrastructurereplacement, water shortages, and competitive pressures, how much is itprudent to spend on long lists of increased security measures to combatunknowable risks? Doubts about our safety have been raised and thesedoubts need to be addressed. Yet, it is difficult to put such doubts to restwhen we cannot reliably quantify the risks. Regrets analysis is a decision technique devised specifically for situationswhere it is not possible to quantify the risk. Regrets analysis focuses insteadon what we do know. We know a lot about the specific threats that we havedefined and about the level and criticality of damage that is possible. Weknow the costs of alternative actions we can take to reduce the risk of suchthreats materializing. We know something about the comparativeeffectiveness of alternative actions in reducing risks or mitigating effects. Looking across all combinations of costs and scenarios,regrets analysis determines which choice has the least chance of being theworst choice over all possibilities. In other words, it shows how you canminimize your potential regrets. This paper presents an example of regrets analysis applied to a securityimprovement decision regarding the protection of a chlorine tank frompossible sabotage. The analysis is developed in a spreadsheet and thefollowing narrative describes the input data required and the analytical stepsinvolved. Includes tables.

Product Details

Edition:

Vol. - No.

Published:

06/17/2004

Number of Pages:

11

File Size:

1 file , 200 KB